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EXIT TAXATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO CORPORATE EMIGRATION FROM THE SPECTRE OF EU TAX LAW








Recently, a number of exit tax regimes have been referred to the Court of Justice, on the basis that they are obstructing the cross-border movement of companies. There are no decided cases on exit taxes affecting corporate mobility – only cases affecting the mobility of individuals. This article studies the extent to which Member States can impose restrictions, in terms of exit taxes, to domestic companies wishing to migrate to another jurisdiction. 

The first part examines the principles derived from the case law of the Court of Justice relating to emigrating individuals. It is then questioned whether the same principles are applicable to exit taxes affecting migrating companies. For this question to be answered, it is considered important to determine the actual scope of protection offered by EU law to migrating companies from a general, non-tax perspective. 

The second part to this article examines the inherent limitations to corporate migration from a private international law perspective and from an EU law perspective. It is made apparent that some of these limitations to corporate mobility, mostly from an outbound perspective, survive in the EU context and are proliferated as a result of the case law of the Court of Justice and the (lack of) legislative framework. 

The third part examines the overall extent to which the case law of the Court of Justice on exit taxes has been affected by developments in the corporate mobility field. It questions whether exit tax regimes affecting migrating companies may be treated more leniently under EU law following the Cartesio judgment or whether the exit tax consequences of the transfer of tax residence do not and should not follow the company law consequences of the transfer of seat of a company. The author concludes by speculating how exit tax cases relating to companies might be dealt with under the Court of Justice.


II.	EXIT TAXATION AND INDIVIDUALS


Exit taxes are all types of charges imposed on a person upon the transfer of their tax residence. They are usually imposed on the unrealised gains over the assets of a person that becomes non-resident or over assets that are transferred to another state. The rationale behind exit taxes is that the home State (i.e. the State of the emigrating person) preserves its taxing rights over gains accruing, but not yet realized in its territory.​[2]​ As under customary international tax law, encapsulated in the OECD Model Tax Convention, capital gains on movable property tend to be taxed in the State of residence of the alienator,​[3]​ in the absence of exit taxes, the home State is likely to lose the right to tax gains accrued prior to the emigration but realized after that event. This is especially problematic and could lead to tax avoidance if the host State (i.e. the State where the company emigrates to) does not impose any taxes on such gains, or the tax burden is much lower there. 

Neither the OECD Model Tax Convention nor the UN Model contain any provisions specifically addressing the tax consequences of emigrating persons. Some countries ignore emigration altogether and do not treat it as a taxable event,​[4]​ or if they do treat it as such, do not impose any exit taxes. Even if they do levy exit taxes, there can be a variety of patterns.​[5]​ Furthermore, exit taxes can be included in specific tax treaty provisions between the countries or they can be treated as a domestic action to which tax treaties do not apply, as the deemed disposal ‘occurs’ immediately before emigration.​[6]​

Arguably, exit taxes are restrictive measures as they hinder a person’s ability to move to another Member State. These taxes only apply to a person moving their tax residence abroad. A person remaining tax resident is taxed on a realization basis, rather than accruals basis. This different treatment could constitute an obstacle to free movement.​[7]​ Furthermore, the imposition of exit taxes could lead to double taxation. Gains could be taxed twice both by the home State and the host State if both States consider to have an exclusive jurisdiction to tax the full gain upon disposal.​[8]​ Also, even if the home State taxes the gain accrued up to the moment of emigration, if the host State does not provide for a step-up according to the deemed disposal value then the pre-emigration gain would be taxed twice. The same consequence would follow if neither State grants a tax credit for the tax levied by the other State, or if neither of the States takes into account decreases of value.​[9]​ Additionally, in cases where there is transfer of assets, double taxation (and double non-taxation) could be the result of mismatches in valuation methods.​[10]​ 

Therefore, it is very likely that exit taxes could be construed as a restriction to the free movement of emigrating taxpayers; mainly, though not exclusively, a restriction to freedom of establishment. So far, the Court of Justice dealt with cases challenging exit taxes imposed on individuals. 

The first​[11]​ important emigration case was Hughes de Laysteyrie du Saillant.​[12]​ Here, an individual taxpayer transferring his residence from France to Belgium was required by French legislation to pay tax on the unrealised increases in the value of his shareholding.​[13]​ The payment of the tax could be suspended until the taxpayer actually sold the shares, but only if the taxpayer provided a guarantee sufficient to ensure recovery of the tax. Also, the tax would be waived if, after five years, the taxpayer still owned the shares.

According to the Court of Justice, freedom of establishment prohibited the home State from restricting the ability of its own nationals to exercise their freedom of establishment in another Member State,​[14]​ even if the restriction was of limited scope or minor importance.​[15]​ Here, although the French rules did not prevent a French taxpayer from exercising their right of establishment, they had a dissuasive effect.​[16]​ The taxpayer became liable, simply by reason of such a transfer, to tax on income which had not yet been realised and which he therefore did not have, whereas, if he remained in France, increases in value would become taxable only when, and to the extent that, they were actually realised. That difference in treatment was likely to discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer.​[17]​

Although it was possible to benefit from suspension of payment, that was not automatic and it was subject to strict conditions,​[18]​ including, in particular, conditions as to the setting up of guarantees. Those guarantees in themselves had a restrictive effect, in that they deprived the taxpayer of the enjoyment of the assets given as a guarantee.​[19]​

It is important to examine the justifications argued at the Court, which ultimately failed. 

Firstly, there was the argument of prevention of tax avoidance. The Court found the French legislation too broad to be justified on such ground. The French rule was not ‘specifically designed to exclude from a tax advantage purely artificial tax arrangements aimed at circumventing French tax law’.​[20]​ As the Court noted, tax avoidance or evasion could not be inferred generally and preemptively from the fact that the tax residence of a physical person had been transferred to another Member State.​[21]​

Secondly, there was the argument that the provision of guarantee ensured the coherence of the French tax system.​[22]​ The Court was not convinced. The French rules were designed to prevent temporary transfers of tax residence outside France exclusively for tax reasons (e.g. to sell their securities).​[23]​ They did not appear to be aimed at ensuring generally that increases in value are to be taxed, in the case where a taxpayer transfers his tax residence outside France, in so far as the increases in value in question are acquired during the taxpayer’s stay on French territory.​[24]​

The Court also rejected the argument that the restriction was justified on the basis of preserving the allocation of tax powers between the home State of departure and the host State. The dispute did “not concern either the allocation of the power to tax between Member States or the right of the French authorities to tax latent increases in value when wishing to react to artificial transfers of tax residence, but the question whether measures adopted to that end comply with the requirements of the freedom of establishment”.​[25]​ The Court concluded that the French exit tax was a breach of freedom of establishment. 

The issues were revisited in the N case.​[26]​ Here, under the Dutch tax rules, substantial shareholders (i.e. shareholders owning at least a 5% interest in a non-transparent entity) who transferred their place of residence outside the Netherlands were subject to an exit tax. Under certain circumstances such as the making of a tax declaration and the provision of security, the taxpayer was granted a 10-year extension to pay (‘conservative tax assessment’). If the 10-year period expired without any disposal of shares, the taxpayer was acquitted from his liability and the security was released.

Mr N emigrated from his permanent residence in the Netherlands to the UK. He was the sole shareholder of three Dutch companies, the management of which had since that date been transferred to the Netherlands Antilles. As a result of the old rules, Mr N received a conservative tax assessment. He complained that the Dutch rules restricted his freedom of movement.

Before reviewing the compatibility of the Dutch rules with freedom of establishment, the Court first confirmed that Mr N’s mere capacity as sole shareholder of his companies allowed him to rely on the freedom of establishment.​[27]​ Citing Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant, the Court of Justice found that the Dutch rules constituted an obstacle to the freedom of establishment.​[28]​ A taxpayer wishing to transfer his residence outside Netherlands territory, in exercise of the rights guaranteed to him by freedom of establishment, was subjected to disadvantageous treatment be being taxed on unrealized gains in comparison with a person who maintained his residence in the Netherlands and who was taxed only on realized gains.​[29]​ Although it was possible to benefit from suspension of payment, this was not automatic and was subject to conditions, such as the provision of guarantees. Those guarantees in themselves had a restrictive effect, in that they deprived the taxpayer of the enjoyment of the assets given as a guarantee.​[30]​

Another important point made by the Court was that as a result of the Dutch rules, decreases in value occurring after the transfer of residence were not taken into account in order to reduce the tax debt. As such, the tax on the unrealised increase in value could have exceeded what Mr N would have had to pay if the disposal had taken place on the same date, without him transferring his residence abroad.​[31]​ Moreover, the tax declaration required at the time of the transfer of resident was an additional formality likely to further hinder the taxpayer’s freedom of establishment.​[32]​

The Court then proceeded to examine whether the restrictive rules were justified. Here, the Court focused on the preservation of taxing powers between Member States; namely, the power to tax increases of value in company holdings.​[33]​ As the Court explained, in the absence of any unifying or harmonizing Community measures, Member States retained the power to define by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation with a view to eliminating double taxation. In so doing, the Member States could draw inspiration in international practice and in particular the OECD Model. The Court referred to Article 13(5) of the OECD Model and argued that the Netherlands was in accordance with the principle of fiscal territoriality, connected with a temporal component, namely residence within the territory during the period in which the taxable profit arises.​[34]​ 

This appears to be an erroneous argument. It has been criticized that the Dutch rules were not fully consistent with the principle of territoriality.​[35]​ Firstly, Article 13(5) of the OECD Model provides for gains from the disposal of assets to be taxed in the State of residence of the person making the disposal and, as such, does not ensure an allocation of taxing rights according to the principle of territoriality. Furthermore, the Court made no explicit reference to the fact that the underlying provision of the UK/Netherlands tax treaty deviated from the OECD Model by conferring on the home State the right to tax gains from disposals of an individual resident in the host State, if the taxpayer was a resident of the home State at any time during the five years immediately preceding the disposal.​[36]​

In any case, the Court found the Dutch rules to be suitable for the attainment of this objective​[37]​ and proceeded to examine the issue of proportionality.

As far as the required tax declaration was concerned, although this was an administrative formality likely to hinder the exercise of fundamental freedoms, the Court found this not to be disproportionate having regard to the legitimate objective of allocating the power of taxation, in particular for the purposes of eliminating double taxation between Member States.​[38]​ The same could not be said, however, regarding the obligation to provide guarantees. This obligation was disproportional as there were methods less restrictive of the fundamental freedoms, such as making use of the Mutual Assistance Directive for the recovery of taxes​[39]​ and the Mutual Assistance Directive for exchange of information.​[40]​ To be proportional, a system for recovering tax on the income from securities would have to take full account of reductions in value capable of arising after the transfer of residence by the taxpayer concerned, unless such reductions have already been taken into account in the host Member State.​[41]​ The Court further noted that the release of the security by the Dutch government could not have amounted to a retrospective lifting of the costs as a result of giving a guarantee.​[42]​

Therefore, it would seem that the Court clearly recognizes that exit taxes restrict the cross-border movement of individuals. The imposition of immediate exit tax restricts the freedom of establishment. What the Court objects to is the home State taxation of unrealized gains of emigrating persons, when such gains are not taxed in a domestic scenario. Furthermore, the obligation for tax declaration at the time of transfer and the obligation to give a guarantee for deferral to be allowed are also restrictive measures. However, exit taxes are not always incompatible with the free movement of persons. As these cases show, they could be justified on the basis of a number of grounds, such as the preservation of the allocation of taxing powers between Member States and prevention of tax avoidance or evasion etc.

Even if there is justification, the restriction has to be proportional. After the N case, it would appear that a tax declaration at the time of transfer, setting out the accrued income but without giving rise to immediate tax is proportional. However, the demand for guarantees for the tax to be deferred is not proportional. Also, any home State exit tax mechanism would have to take into account reduction in value arising after the transfer of residence, unless such reductions have already been taken into account in the host Member State. 

All the above suggest a high level of co-ordination between Member States to ensure there is no double taxation or double non-taxation as a result of the transfer of residence of a person. The Commission recognizes this as well as the problematic effect of exit taxes on cross-border movement. In its Communication on Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of Member States tax policies,​[43]​ it urged Member States to co-ordinate their exit tax policies. The Commission suggested a number of ways to ensure co-ordination and to resolve mismatches leading to double taxation or double non-taxation. For example, the home State could give a credit for host State taxes and vice-versa,​[44]​ or the two States could divide taxing rights on the gains with decreases in value to be taken into account by either State,​[45]​ or the host State could be required to allow a step-up based on the market value established in the home State,​[46]​ or each Member State would continue to value the assets according to their own rules but provide for a procedure to resolve valuation disputes.​[47]​ The Commission emphasized that all these methods depend on effective administrative co-operation and mutual recognition.​[48]​ 

The European Council has also voiced its concerns over exit taxes and adopted a resolution promoting coordination.​[49]​ The resolution invited Member States to adopt a number of guiding principles for the transfer of economic activities​[50]​ between Member States. Broadly, these principles provide for symmetrical treatment.​[51]​ Very importantly, therefore, the resolution states that the host State must allow a step-up in the base cost when the home State taxes unrealized gains. ​[52]​ In case of disagreement between the host State and the home State regarding the value of the assets on the transfer date, the Member States should set up a procedure for settling their dispute.​[53]​ The host State could require from the emigrating taxpayer to provide evidence that the home State has exercised or will exercise its rights and evidence of the value applied by the exit State.​[54]​ 

It should be pointed out that the above cases dealt with individuals transferring their residence to another Member State. However, a company transferring its residence abroad may equally suffer exit taxes on unrealised gains and hidden reserves. In fact, there has been a spade of recent cases where exit tax provisions affecting companies are challenged. Formal requests had been made by the Commission to a number of Member States, which subsequently led to their being referred to the Court of Justice.​[55]​ Furthermore, infringement proceedings have started against Norway by the EFTA Surveillance Authority.​[56]​ There is also a pending reference from a Dutch court questioning the compatibility of the national exit tax rules affecting companies.​[57]​ More cases are likely to follow. In fact, there are concerns that the UK tax legislation may also in the future be targeted for imposing restrictive exit taxes on companies that transfer their residence abroad.​[58]​ 

How are these to be assessed by the Court of Justice? Would the principles of the case law on individuals be applied vis-à-vis corporate entities? Even though the Commission Communication and the European Council resolution are not limited to exit taxes on emigrating individuals, it ought not to be assumed that the principles of the existing case law will automatically apply to migrating companies.​[59]​ For this question to be answered, it is important to consider the specific context of corporate mobility. Exit taxes do pose substantial problems to companies that wish to emigrate to another jurisdiction. This, however, does not mean that absent such taxes corporate mobility would be unhindered. As shown in the next section, there could be other, non-tax specific restrictions which EU law itself cannot prohibit. 


III.	CAN EU COMPANIES’ FREELY MIGRATE?


In this part to the article, it is shown that before exit taxes can even be considered, there are other inherent limitations to a company’s ability to migrate, which challenge the very basic applicability of freedom of establishment. This could be the result of substantive national laws or conflict of laws rules of the home State or of the host State, upon which EU law has had surprisingly little effect. 

There are two important conflict of laws theories which are relevant to companies and their ability to migrate: the incorporation theory and the real seat theory. The interplay of these theories with EU law is very interesting. 

The incorporation theory​[60]​ connects a company to the jurisdiction in which it has been incorporated. Under this theory, the existence, internal affairs and dissolution of a company are determined by the State of incorporation. This is irrespective of any activities, minimal or substantial, pursued in other States. Once a company has satisfied the formation requirements in its State of incorporation, then it is recognised everywhere. Furthermore, a company can transfer its administrative seat​[61]​ in another State without losing its legal personality. As long as the registered office remains in the State of incorporation, the emigrating company remains subject to the laws of that State.​[62]​

Incorporation States accept companies which are formed in other States but which have their effective management in their jurisdiction. The legal capacity and legal personality of such companies are recognised, without a need to reincorporate. In some incorporation States, however, there are exceptions to protect persons dealing with overseas companies carrying on business in their jurisdictions.​[63]​ 

The real seat theory​[64]​ focuses on there being a substantial connection between a company and the legal system upon which it depends for formation and the establishment of legal personality. Under this theory, only the State in which the company has its real seat (i.e. its actual centre of administration) has the power to regulate the company’s internal affairs. A company has to register or incorporate in the country where it has its centre of administration. 

A company which is incorporated in one State but which has its administrative seat in another State that follows the real seat theory may not be recognised as a company in the real seat State.​[65]​  This could lead to very detrimental results such as loss of limited liability of the company.​[66]​ Another consequence of the real seat theory is that a company duly formed in a real seat State cannot transfer its actual centre of administration to another state (i.e. to emigrate) without a change in the governing law of the company and/or dissolution.​[67]​ 

From the above, it is evident that a number of issues arise which may hinder cross-border corporate migration, or prevent it altogether. From an outbound/emigration perspective, the company may not be allowed to transfer its registered and/or administrative seat without having to wind-up and dissolve first. From an inbound/immigration perspective, the company may not be recognized in the host State as a foreign company, losing the protection of the limited liability status. In addition, the company may have to reincorporate in the host State or have to adjust part or its entire internal law.

One would have thought that these restrictions are of a type to be curbed under EU law, being an obstacle to the free movement of companies. However, in reality, the effect of EU law, both in terms of legislation and case law has been rather limited.

This can perhaps be attributed to the very basic phrasing of freedom of establishment. The key issue under this freedom, as set out in Arts 49 and 54 TFEU, is that the companies and firms that wish to benefit from it, must have been formed in accordance with the laws of the Member State and have the connecting factor required by that Member State; i.e. a registered office or an administrative seat. The freedom does not show any preference for the incorporation theory or the real seat theory. It is a question of national law (i.e. of national connecting factors and rules on the transfer of those factors) whether an undertaking has been formed in accordance with the laws of the Member State to enjoy the protection of freedom of establishment. Being a question of national law, the restrictions to a company’s ability to migrate because of these two theories, are perpetuated under the EU Treaties. 

Moreover, no secondary legal instruments have been enacted to deal with these restrictions and provide coordinated solutions. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to provide a treaty​[68]​ or a legislative framework​[69]​ in which corporate mobility would be enhanced. Most of these proposals contained provisions to allow the transfer of registered or administrative seat, without dissolution. At the same time, they allowed Member States to have laws in place which would protect workers, shareholders, creditors, debenture holders and other security holders. However, none of these proposals reached fruition. 

There have been recent calls, from the European Parliament, for the Commission to propose a directive facilitating the cross-border transfer of the registered office of a company.​[70]​ The Commission has not done so and it is uncertain whether it will do so. It appears so far that the Commission is unable or unwilling to find solutions to the issues arising from the co-existence of the incorporation theory and the real seat theory. In any case, most of the draft suggestions seem to accept both theories and simply attempt to mitigate the problems from their simultaneous application. What is questionable though is why the Commission cannot proceed even with such compromised solutions. 

Overall, the lack of legislative rules seems to exacerbate the uncertainties relating to migrating companies. As a result, it is often unclear in what circumstances freedom of establishment offers protection to companies moving out of a Member State or moving into a Member State, and the extent of that protection. This is evident in the case law of the Court of Justice, where freedom of establishment was invoked in situations in which companies transferred their seat (or attempted to transfer their seat) to another Member State.

The Daily Mail case​[71]​ was the first case to be considered. Here, Daily Mail wanted to transfer its central management and control (i.e. its primary establishment) in the Netherlands whilst retaining its status as a UK company. For the transfer to be allowed, consent from the Treasury was required as the company would become non-resident​[72]​ and no longer subject to UK corporation tax.​[73]​  After negotiations, the Treasury agreed to give its consent on condition that the company would sell part of the assets before transferring its residence outside of the UK.​[74]​ Daily Mail argued that this condition violated its freedom of establishment. It initiated proceedings before the High Court of Justice, which stayed the proceedings and referred the case to the Court of Justice.

The Court found that in the present state of Community law, freedom of establishment could not be interpreted “as conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a Member State a right to transfer their central management and control and their central administration to another Member State while retaining their status as companies incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State”.​[75]​ Therefore, there was no reason why the UK should be prevented from making the transfer subject to tax approval. The Court emphasized that the question of whether and how a registered office or head office already incorporated in one Member State may be transferred to another was not resolved by freedom of establishment but was the subject of national law.​[76]​ 

Although it has been suggested that the Court of Justice endorsed the real set theory,​[77]​ this seems to be an over-expansive interpretation of the actual decision. In Daily Mail, the Court did not examine conflict of laws rules nor the issue of recognition of a foreign company. It did not address the issue of winding-up required by the country of incorporation but rather the requirement for Treasury consent for the transfer of residence of a company, in anticipation of the tax consequences. In fact, the Court stressed that the EC Treaty endorsed the various connecting factors in the same way.​[78]​ Furthermore, the Court’s ruling was limited to situations in which companies wanted to transfer their central management and control and their central administration to another Member State while retaining their status as companies incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State.​[79]​

In hindsight, Daily Mail only dealt with migration from an outbound perspective; the focus was on the duties of the home State. Different principles could apply vis-à-vis the host State. Furthermore, different principles could apply when a company wished to emigrate without retaining its status in the country of incorporation. In other words, inbound migration and non-identity-preserving outbound migration could be treated differently. This distinction became crucial in the Cartesio case,​[80]​ discussed below. Prior to Cartesio, however, a number of immigration cases were decided in a much less restrictive way. These cases were Centros,​[81]​ Überseering​[82]​ and Inspire Art.​[83]​

In Centros,​[84]​ a private limited company (Centros) was registered in England but had never traded there since its formation. Most of the business of the company was in fact conducted through a Danish branch. The Danish Board for Trade and Companies refused the registration of the Danish branch on the grounds that Centros, which did not trade in the UK, was in fact seeking to establish a principal establishment in Denmark, rather than a branch. This would have circumvented national rules such as minimum capital requirements. Centros argued that the Board’s refusal to register its Danish branch violated its freedom of establishment. The case was referred to the Court of Justice.

The Court of Justice agreed with Centros. When a company formed in accordance with the law of a Member State in which it has its registered office wants to set up a branch in another Member State, this situation falls within the scope of Community law. “In that regard, it is immaterial that the company was formed in the first Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in the second, where its main, or indeed entire, business is to be conducted.”​[85]​ The question of the application of the freedom was different from the question of whether measures could be adopted by a Member State in order to prevent attempts by certain of its nationals to evade domestic legislation.​[86]​ 

The Court of Justice found that the refusal to register the branch was an obstacle to the exercise of freedom of establishment. Although Member States were entitled to take measures designed to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law,​[87]​ here there was no abuse of the right of establishment. Formation according to the laws of a Member State was sufficient to trigger freedom of establishment and enable a company to set up a branch in another Member State. ​[88]​ The fact that Centros chose to set up an establishment in the Member State whose rules of company law seem the least restrictive and the fact that the entire business was to be conducted through the branch were not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct.​[89]​ As the restriction was not justified,​[90]​ the Court of Justice concluded that the fact that a Member State could not refuse registration of the branch.​[91]​

The Überseering case​[92]​ was decided in a similar way. Überseering BV (Überseering) was a Dutch company whose shares had been acquired by two German nationals. It tried to sue a German company for defective building work but the German courts dismissed the action. It was found that, whilst still incorporated in the Netherlands, Überseering had transferred its actual centre of administration in Germany and had become subject to German law. As it had not followed the required formation formalities under German law, Überseering did not have legal capacity in Germany and could not bring proceedings there.​[93]​ 

On a reference to the Court of Justice, it found that the refusal to give standing or to recognise the legal capacity of a company validly incorporated in another Member State was a restriction to the freedom of establishment.​[94]​ The restriction was not justified on the basis of overriding requirements in the public interest, such as protection of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and tax authorities.​[95]​ This was tantamount to an outright prohibition on freedom of establishment. 

In Inspire Art​[96]​, the facts were similar to Centros. Inspire Art was a company formed in the UK but which carried all its activities in the Netherlands. The only reason that Inspire Art had incorporated in the UK was to take advantage of the less onerous English company law requirements and in particular the rules on minimum share capital. Inspire Art had a branch in the Netherlands. Under Dutch legislation,​[97]​ Inspire Art was considered as a formally foreign company and had to be indicated as such under the registration of the branch in the commercial register.​[98]​ Through its branch, it also had to fulfill a number of additional requirements​[99]​ non-compliance with which led to penalties.​[100]​ Inspire Arte refused to comply with these formalities, arguing that they were incompatible with freedom of establishment.

The Court agreed with its arguments. It followed its previous ruling in Centros in that the fact that the company was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in a second Member State, where its main, or indeed entire, business was to be conducted was a legitimate exercise of its freedoms and not per se an instance of abuse.​[101]​ As in Überseering, the situation was distinguished from that in Daily Mail being one of immigration rather than emigration.​[102]​

The effect of the Dutch rules on formally foreign companies was that company law provisions on minimum capital and directors’ liability were applied mandatorily to foreign companies such as Inspire Art when they carried on their activities exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the Netherlands. This restricted their freedom of establishment and restriction was not justified.​[103]​  Therefore, the Court of Justice concluded that the Dutch legislation was contrary to freedom of establishment.

Following these cases, there was a lot of debate as to whether Daily Mail was still good law and as such emigration and immigration cases are treated differently under freedom of establishment or whether the Court had moved away from the Daily Mail case. Whilst Cartesio​[104]​ laid some of these issues to rest, it also raised a lot of new questions.

Here, Cartesio, a company incorporated in Hungary was prevented from transferring its operational headquarters to Italy, without transferring its registered office; i.e. without a change in governing law. Under Hungarian law, a cross-border transfer of operational headquarters could only be done if the company was first dissolved in Hungary and then reincorporated under Italian law. There was no such requirement for transfers within Hungary. Cartesio argued that the requirement to dissolve and reincorporate was in breach of freedom of establishment. The Hungarian court of appeal referred the case to the Court of Justice. 

Contrary to the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court of Justice rejected Cartesio’s claim, finding that the Hungarian rules were compatible with freedom of establishment. The Court of Justice cited the Daily Mail case approvingly, reiterating the point that “companies are creatures of national law and exist only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning”.​[105]​ 

A Member State could refuse to allow a company incorporated under domestic law and moving its seat to another Member State to remain governed by its laws. The Court emphasized that a Member State had the power to define both the connecting factor required for a company to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and the connecting factor required if the company was to be able to maintain that status.​[106]​ That power included the possibility for a Member State not to permit a company governed by its law to retain that status if the company intended to reorganize itself in another Member State by moving its seat to the territory of the latter, thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the national law of the Member State of incorporation.​[107]​

The Court proceeded to make a distinction. Cartesio dealt with the situation where the seat of a company incorporated under the law of one Member State was transferred to another Member State with no change as regards the law which governs that company – i.e. transfer without reincorporation. This situation was, according to the Court of Justice, distinguishable from that where a company moved to another Member State and was converted into a form of company which was governed by the laws of that other Member State i.e. transfer with reincorporation and a change of governing law. The latter situation could be covered by EU law. If the host State allowed such migration under its laws but the home State made it dependent on the prior winding-up or liquidation of the company, then this would be a restriction to the freedom of establishment.​[108]​ In this case, Cartesio wished to transfer its real seat from Hungary to Italy, while remaining a company governed by Hungarian law – i.e. without reincorporation.​[109]​ This situation was not, therefore, covered by freedom of establishment.​[110]​

It is obvious from the case law that the Court prefers not to interfere with Member States’ connecting factors in determining whether a company is (and remains) incorporated in that Member State so as to enjoy the protection of freedom of establishment. Subject to the limited exception set out in Cartesio,​[111]​ the Court does not interfere with the question of whether an incorporation or real seat home State can demand the dissolution of a company transferring its registered and/or administrative seat in another State.​[112]​ In other words, restrictions from an outbound/emigration perspective largely persist, though the Court has refrained from accepting a general immunity.

By contrast, the Court appears much stricter as regards restrictions imposed by the host State such non-recognition of the foreign company, imposition of additional compliance requirements, lack of legal standing, requirement to reincorporate or adjust part of its entire internal law. This is evident in the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases. Therefore, restrictions from an inbound/immigration perspective are less likely to survive.

Where does this leave us with the exit taxes imposed on companies transferring their residence abroad?


IV.	CORPORATE EMIGRATION, THE TRANSFER OF RESIDENCE AND EXIT TAXATION


As mentioned in Part II, the Commission’s scrutiny of Member State exit tax provisions, especially those that affect the ability of a company to emigrate, seems to have intensified. The impugned exit tax provisions are of a similar nature. They mainly impose taxation on unrealized gains and are triggered when a company transfers its tax residence to another Member State.​[113]​ How are these cases to be assessed by the Court of Justice? Will the judgments be influenced by the developments under the corporate mobility case law? Or will the latter actually be counter-intuitive?

In Cartesio, the Court confirmed the Member States’ right to choose the connecting factors for companies to be to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State and to remain in existence. Therefore, when a company transfers its seat to another Member State in circumstances in which it has to wind up and reincorporate in the other Member State, because of the rules of the home State, then EU law does not interfere with these rules. However, freedom of establishment protects an emigrating company which was converted into a form of company governed by the laws of the host State. To the extent that this was permitted by the host State, then the home State could not make it dependent on the prior winding-up or liquidation of the company. 

If Cartesio is applied in the context of exit taxes on companies, it would introduce the prior question of whether freedom of establishment is at all triggered. This would be akin to a pre-emption test, the failure of which would mean that freedom of establishment does not apply. One would first need to ask whether this is a situation whereby the transfer of registered seat or administrative seat​[114]​ of a company without reincorporation requires winding up as a result of the home State rules on connecting factors. If this is the case, then freedom of establishment would not be applicable. If, however, a company wants to transfer its seat and reincorporate changing its governing law in order to comply with host State corporate laws, then freedom of establishment would be applicable. If the home Member State requires the company to dissolve, then this could be a restriction to its freedom of establishment.

Under this interpretation, when the transfer of residence affects the continuity of legal personality because of the application of the Member State’s connecting factor, then restrictions such as dissolution/liquidation and possibly by extension exit taxation may be deemed not to be covered by freedom of establishment.​[115]​ By contrast, when national law allows the transfer of residence to another Member State without impinging the continuity of legal personality of the company, but requires dissolution when the company chooses to reincorporate, then as this would be covered by freedom of establishment, the exit tax repercussions may also be addressed.

However, in my view, this is not a satisfactory approach. The transfer of a connecting factor for company law purposes is not necessarily the same as the transfer of residence for tax purposes and ought not to be equated by applying the Cartesio distinction. This is because the transfer of residence of a company depends on the connecting factors applied in a jurisdiction for tax purposes. Different jurisdictions have different connecting factors: registered office, place of incorporation, domicile, place of management or administrative seat​[116]​ etc. Furthermore, some jurisdictions may use one connecting factor for the test of residence and others may use two factors, to be applied alternatively or cumulatively. 

If a jurisdiction applies the incorporation test as its sole test for company residence, then a company could be tax resident there, only if it is incorporated. Having its place of management in that jurisdiction would not be relevant for tax purposes, nor would the transfer of that factor. Only if the company ceased to be incorporated in that jurisdiction would it become non-resident; i.e. only then would it be treated as having transferred its residence for tax purposes. The reverse would also apply if the jurisdiction uses as a connecting factor the place of management (or an equivalent of that) of the company. Only the existence of this connecting factor could render the company tax resident and only the transfer of this factor could render the company non-resident.

If a jurisdiction uses two alternative connecting factors to determine tax residence, such as the place of incorporation and the place of management, then the transfer of either factor alone would have no effect as regards tax residence. Both would have to be transferred unless there is an agreement between the home State and the host State deeming a company to become non-resident on the transfer of one factor only.​[117]​ 

It is obvious that the connecting factors used for tax purposes may be similar with the connecting factors used for company law purposes. However, they are not the same and, most importantly, they serve different purposes. The former look at whether a company is subject to the tax jurisdiction of a State. They assume the existence and validity of the company. The latter look at whether a company is validly formed in a jurisdiction and continues to be so.

Obviously, the transfer of seat of a company could lead to the transfer of tax residence as well.​[118]​ However, this is not an automatic assumption. As mentioned above, if the test for tax residence is the place of management of a company and there is a transfer of registered office, then the transfer of seat for company law purposes would not lead to the transfer of tax residence. Or if the test for tax residence is the incorporation test and there is a transfer of administrative seat, again, this transfer of seat would not lead to the transfer of tax residence. 

At the same time, there could be transfer of tax residence without transfer of seat. The UK offers a good example of this. Under UK tax laws, a company’s residence can be established by reference to either the common law test of central management and control or the statutory test of the place of incorporation.​[119]​ The UK does not have any procedures enabling the registration of a UK-incorporated company to be transferred from the UK to another country. In other words, there can be no transfer of registered office without dissolution​[120]​ as a result of the home State rules on connecting factors. Arguably, this would fall under the Cartesio pre-emption test. However, if the company transfers its central management and control to the host State and relies on the tie-breaker clause in the residence article of the relevant double tax treaty, it could become treaty-non-resident.​[121]​ Here, there would be transfer of tax residence without transfer of the connecting factor for company law purposes. 

Therefore, the transfer of tax residence is not the same as the transfer of corporate seat. Equating the two is, it is submitted, erroneous. It could lead to situations where the transfer of a connecting factor is not allowed under domestic corporate law but there is in fact a transfer of tax residence. If restrictive exit tax rules apply because of this latter transfer, does this mean they cannot even be considered due to the inapplicability of freedom of establishment as per the Cartesio pre-emption test? How can this be right if the restriction as a result of the exit taxes is for reasons irrelevant to the fact that the corporate connecting factor cannot move under home State rules? The exit taxes have been triggered because there is a transfer of tax residence. The transfer of the corporate connecting factor is neither here nor there.  

It is submitted that the Cartesio test does not make much sense in the context of exit taxes for companies. A company could become non-resident for tax purposes irrespective of an obligation to wind-up, either as a result of the application of the home State’s connecting factor or as a consequence of the company wanting to change governing law. Therefore, in most situations, as far as the home State (i.e. the exit State) is concerned, the migrating company ceases to exist for tax purposes. Here an exit tax functions as a final settlement tax and is triggered by the transfer of residence - not because the company reincorporates elsewhere, whether by choice or as a result of the home State’s connecting factors. In other words, the exit tax would have been imposed even if the company that ceased to exist was never reincorporated anywhere – i.e. if it ceased to exist for other reasons.​[122]​ 

Therefore, making the applicability of the freedom of establishment depend on the event of reincorporation in the host State seems nonsensical. The exit tax consequences do not always follow the company law consequences of the transfer. Nor should they be. It would lead to Member States hiding their exit tax regimes behind their company law compliant systems.​[123]​ In my view, the Cartesio pre-emption test does not and should not apply to exit tax cases. If an exit tax is imposed in situations whereby a company transfers its seat to another Member State without having to reincorporate, this does not mean that the transfer is not protected under freedom of establishment. In such situations, there should not be immunity for all restrictions including exit taxes. 

One could argue that what the Court decided upon in Cartesio was the right of a Member State to impose an outright prohibition on the ability of a company to transfer its administrative seat to another Member State without reincorporation. The Court did not consider restrictive measures such as exit taxes which allowed this transfer but effectively made it more expensive or cumbersome. In other words, Cartesio looked at a case where the act of migration was prohibited altogether. The exit tax case law looks at the situation where the act of migration is allowed, but made more expensive. Given the Court’s dislike of pre-emptive prohibitions, it is unlikely that the exit tax case law will follow the Cartesio line of reasoning and confer to Member States blanket immunities vis-à-vis their exit tax regimes. 

Furthermore, let us not forget that the interpretation of the Cartesio pre-emption test, right or wrong, is limited to freedom of establishment. However, exit taxes could be triggered in situations where free movement of capital is the only relevant freedom. This could be the case if there is a transfer of shares to a non-resident transferee company in which the transferor company has no definite influence.​[124]​ Although this is not the typical scenario of corporate emigration examined in this article, it may still be a taxable event. There is nothing in Cartesio suggesting that the pre-emption test would extend to other freedoms. In fact, it is impossible to interpret it as such. Here, it is not an issue of whose jurisdiction it falls to determine the existence and/or continuance of a company for the purposes of finding whether a cross-border establishment has been generated. Rather, here, there is an undisputed cross-border movement of capital. The problem is that it is being restricted as a result of the application of exit taxes. As there cannot be a prima facie question of inapplicability of the free movement of capital in such circumstances, highly arbitrary results would follow if the Cartesio pre-emption test is insisted upon. Some exit taxes affecting cross-border establishment would be immune whereas others affecting the movement of capital would not be.   

In my view, the Cartesio precedent is unlikely to be followed in the exit tax cases. The Court of Justice is more likely to find the imposition of immediate exit taxation upon the transfer of tax residence (or other taxable event) to be a restriction to the freedom of establishment and/or the free movement of capital. Any additional formalities and burdens for deferring such taxation will also be found restrictive. 

The salient question will, therefore, be whether a restriction as a result of exit taxes can be justified on the basis of overriding requirements in the public interest. Here, analogies could be drawn with the exit tax case law on individuals considered in Part II and the following grounds could be invoked: prevention of tax avoidance/evasion and effectiveness of fiscal supervision, preserving the coherence of the tax system, protecting the allocation of taxing powers.

As far as prevention of tax avoidance, the Court has consistently rejected this ground when the tax measure was of a general nature not specifically designed to exclude from a tax advantage purely artificial tax arrangements aimed at circumventing the national tax laws.​[125]​ As the Court noted in Hughes de Lasteyrie, the transfer of a physical person’s tax residence outside the territory of a Member State does not, in itself, imply tax avoidance.​[126]​ The same could be said as regards the transfer of a company’s tax residence. At least from the perspective of the case law on inbound migration examined in Part III, corporate forum shopping is not per se an abusive practice. A national of a Member State can set up a company in the Member State whose company law rules seem to be the least restrictive and conduct all the business of the company in another Member State through a branch. Such company should not be forced to comply with additional administrative obligations in the host State. 

It could be argued that, by analogy, it is not abuse or tax avoidance when a company emigrates from a Member State to benefit from a more lenient tax regime in the host State. Even if the economic and fiscal reasons were behind the emigration of the company this does not seem to be a relevant consideration according to the Court in the inbound migration cases.​[127]​ In any case, such reasons are unlikely to be relevant to the test of avoidance at least from the home State perspective, as the home State would be less able to show, at the time of emigration, that the company is seeking to benefit in the future from the host State tax system in an inappropriate way. It may be a relevant consideration for the host State if it is asked to apply a step-up in basis or to confer a credit. This article, however, focuses on the rights and obligations of the home State, in applying their exit tax regime.

As far as the ground of effectiveness of fiscal supervision is concerned, to an extent, it is true that exit taxes function as a protective measure. Once a company transfers its tax residence to another jurisdiction, unless there are good exchange of information and mutual assistance provisions between the home State and the host State, it may be difficult for the home State to recover any tax on future disposals by the non-resident company. It is noteworthy that the Court rejected such arguments in the case law on individuals, on the basis that the Mutual Assistance Directive​[128]​ could apply to enable the home State to recover any taxes from non-resident individuals. Would the same argument apply vis-à-vis non-resident companies? In other words, is it any more difficult to collect taxes from emigrating companies than emigrating individuals?

Not necessarily. There is no reason why the Mutual Assistance Directive cannot apply in situations where there is a transfer of residence of a company,​[129]​ especially if there is continuity of legal identity. One could even argue that an exit tax is much less necessary when the migrating company has not reincorporated elsewhere and remains the same legal entity in the home State, as it may be easier for the home State to enforce its revenue claims on a legal entity still in existence and governed by the same laws - albeit a non-resident one.​[130]​ 

The situation may be different if the company is required to dissolve as a result of the home State (corporate) connecting factors; for example, if the company chooses to reincorporate in the host State and convert into another company. Here, it needs to be examined whether the Mutual Assistance Directive can apply to recover the tax debts of a dissolved/emigrating company from the converted company. It would seem that the scope of the Directive is broad enough to enable the home State to seek assistance from the host State in such circumstances.​[131]​ However, it needs to be borne in mind that usually taxes upon the dissolution of a company are not technically exit taxes but final taxes in the process of liquidation. The company has wound up and it needs to finalise its tax affairs. Therefore, such taxes are not true exit taxes and may not really be under attack by the Commission in this context.

Therefore, for the ground of effectiveness of fiscal supervision to succeed, it would need to be shown that the transfer of residence leads to a loss of all nexus by the home State which cannot be remedied by the application of the Mutual Assistance Directive. In other words, the crucial question is not whether there has been reincorporation or not in the host State, but rather whether the home State has a way of enforcing its tax debt on the emigrating company after emigration.

One could also point to the solution adopted under the Merger Directive. For specific types of mergers and reorganisations, the Directive provides for deferral of taxes in the Member State of the dissolving company for qualifying transfers of assets and stock that are taken over by a permanent establishment of the receiving company in the Member State of the transferring/acquired company. As these assets and stock are attributed to the permanent establishment in the Member State of the transferring/acquired company, then there is no loss of taxing jurisdiction.​[132]​ It is uncertain whether the Court would imply a requirement for a remaining permanent establishment for a company to be allowed to emigrate without exit taxes to apply. This would appear to be a retrograde step.​[133]​ 

Exit taxes may also be justified on the basis of preserving the fiscal cohesion of the tax system, though it is highly disputed whether this ground can at all apply in this context. As held in Wielockx,​[134]​ the principle of fiscal cohesion has to apply to one and the same person by a strict correlation between deductions and taxation. If there is an underlying tax treaty, then fiscal cohesion is shifted to another level: that of the reciprocity of the rules applicable between the two contracting States to the tax treaty. On this basis, the fiscal cohesion ground could not apply, as most tax treaties follow the OECD Model and as such confer an exclusive right to tax capital gains arising from movable property to the State of residence. The original State of residence (i.e. the home State) is not given any right to tax gains accruing until the date of emigration and as such the issue of fiscal cohesion does not arise.​[135]​

Even if this argument is ignored, for the justification to succeed, it would need to be shown that the home State exit tax system is symmetric and that the home State in its capacity as host State, refrains from taxing any gains incurred prior to immigration. As such, the home State levying the exit tax would, for example, have to grant a step-up in basis to the assets of an immigrating company, or give a credit for exit taxes paid by an immigrating company. Therefore, this justification could apply in limited circumstances, if at all.

Lastly, it could be argued that exit taxes are necessary to preserve the balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States.​[136]​ The problem with this justification, however, is that the imposition of exit taxes, whether for immediate or deferred collection, does not in fact protect the allocation of taxing powers between the home State and the host State. Unless there is an underlying agreement between the home State and the host State as to who can tax capital gains accruing over two jurisdictions, then there is no allocation of taxing rights. Imposition of exit taxes would appear to be a unilateral exercise of taxing powers by the home State rather than a bilaterally agreed allocation of tax competences between two States. 

Even if there were an underlying agreement between the States, this would usually follow Article 13 of the OECD Model and confer exclusive taxing rights to the country of residence at the time of disposal. Therefore, the home State exit taxes would technically be contrary to this allocation. Furthermore, if exit taxes are seen as levied immediately before the transfer of residence of a company and as such are construed as a domestic tax not involving the tax treaty’s allocation choices, then again, this would appear a unilateral exercise of taxing powers.​[137]​ There would be no question of breaching the bilateral allocation between the home State and the host State.

Therefore, the justification grounds may not be readily applicable and certainly not in all circumstances. In any case, even if the restrictive exit taxes are found to be justified, they would still have to be proportional. As suggested from the exit tax case law on individuals set out in Part II, immediate collection of the exit taxes, or the requirement for tax declaration giving rise to immediate tax or the demand for guarantees for the exit tax to be deferred are unlikely to be proportional. Furthermore, decreases in value arising after the transfer of residence, to the extent that they are not taken into account by the host Member State, would have to be taken into account by the home State.
















^1	  Dr Christiana HJI Panayi, BA, BCL, PhD. Senior Lecturer in Tax Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Researcher at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The contents of this article are based on materials available up to 1/3/2011.
^2	  See László Kovács, “European Commission Policy on Exit Taxation”, in  Exit Tax: Comparative Analysis in a EU Perspective (Studi Tributari Europei 2009), p.4
^3	  See Article 13(5) OECD Model. For commentary, see Stefano Simontacchi, Taxation of Capital Gains under the OECD Model Convention, With Special Regard to Immovable Property, (Kluwer Law, The Hague 2007).
^4	  This is usually the case if these countries do not levy capital gains taxes.
^5	  Some countries levy general exit taxes on accrued gains in all items of appreciated property, others limit taxes on accrued gains in specific items of appreciated property (e.g. on shares and securities), others impose trailing taxes or prefer claw-backs of deductions and tax deferrals etc. For different types of regimes, see De Broe’s General Report, ‘The tax treatment of transfer of residence by individuals’, Cahiers de droit fiscal International, IFA, vol LXXXVIIb, Kluwer 2002. Also see various country reports in IFA vol LXXXVIIb, Kluwer 2002.
^6	  See Communication on Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of Member States tax policies, COM (2006) 825 final, p.4. This Communication was released on 19 December 2006. Also see Kerstin Malmer, “Emigration taxes and EC Law”, European Union Report at IFA 2002 (IFA, vol LXXXVIIb, Kluwer 2002), p.88
^7	  See Communication on Exit taxation, fn.6, p.3
^8	  This could be the case, for example, if the home State deems the emigrating person to continue to be tax resident for the purposes of the gains or if home State and host State claim jurisdiction over gains from the capital gains of a former resident and a resident respectively or if the underlying movable asset remains in the home State.
^9	  Also see Communication on Exit taxation, fn.6, pp.4-5
^10	  For example, if an asset is transferred from a home State that exercises its taxing rights at the moment of transfer, to a host State which values the transferred asset at book value but subsequently taxes any increase in value upon the disposal of the asset, this could lead to double taxation. The reverse would lead to double non-taxation. See Communication on Exit taxation, fn.6, p.7.
^11	  An earlier case dealt, not so much with an emigrating individual, but with an ‘emigrating’ asset. In  Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, two Swedish nationals wanted to transfer at undervalue their shares in a Swedish company X, to another Swedish company Z, which was a subsidiary of a Belgian company Y. Under Swedish tax law, where the transfer was to a foreign legal person in which the transferor directly or indirectly had a holding or to a Swedish limited company in which such a foreign legal person either directly or indirectly had a holding, then the transfer was taxed at market value. If the transfer was made to a Swedish company owned by a Swedish resident, then there was no immediate taxation and taxation of capital gains was deferred until the transferor disposed of its shareholding. On reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice found that the refusal of tax deferral, restricted the freedom of establishment of the taxpayer and depending on the holding of the taxpayer in the non-resident transferee company, the free movement of capital as well. This restriction was not justified by overriding requirements in the public interest; namely, the cohesion of the Swedish tax system, the risk of tax evasion and ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. For commentary, see M. Nettinga, “Denial of tax advantages for the transfer at undervalue of shares to companies in which the transferor has a holding infringes Arts 43 and 48 and 56 and 58”, (2003) European Taxation, EC Update February 2003, p. 6
^12	  Case C-9/02 Hughes de Laysterie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-02409. For commentary, see Timothy J. Lyons, “Out with an Exit Charge: Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant”, [2004] 6 British Tax Review 589; C. Docclo and P. Elliot, “Case law on taxation in the European Union – Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant”, (2004) 3 EC Tax Review 146; Otmar Thommes, “French exit taxation for individuals violates EC Treaty”, (2004) 6/7 Intertax 343; Gero Burwitz, “Tax consequences of the migration of companies: a practitioner's perspective”, 7 (2006) 2 European Business Organization Law Review 589-604
^13	  The taxpayer held either directly or indirectly with members of his family, securities conferring entitlement to more than 25% of the profits of a company subject to corporation tax and established in France.
^14	  Case C-9/02, paragraph 42, citing Case C-251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I-2787, paragraph 28 and case law cited therein.
^15	  Ibid, paragraph 43.
^16	  Ibid, paragraph 45
^17	  Ibid, paragraph 46
^18	  The taxpayer had to lodge a specific application for deferment at the same time as making the latent capital gains declaration. Failure to meet this time-limit meant that deferment was forfeited. The taxpayer also had to designate a tax representative with power to represent him vis-à-vis the tax authorities. Furthermore, he was under an annual obligation to send the tax authorities a statement of changes in the (unrealized) capital gains in question. Any delay in doing so could have lead to forfeiture of the deferment. See paragraphs 36-38 of Advocate General’s opinion.
^19	  Ibid, paragraph 47
^20	  Ibid, paragraph 50
^21	  Ibid, paragraph 51
^22	  Ibid, paragraph 63
^23	  Ibid, paragraph 64
^24	  Ibid, paragraph 65. As the Court noted, such finding was supported by the fact that the French tax system did not tax realised increases in value subject to taxation in the country to which the taxpayer transferred his tax residence. This meant that realised increases in value, including the part of them acquired during the taxpayer’s stay in France, were entirely taxed in that country. See paragraph 66.
^25	  Ibid, paragraph 68
^26	  Case C-470/04 N case [2006] ECR I-7409. For commentary, see Hans Van den Hurk & Jasper Korving, “Netherlands: the ECJ's judgment in the N case against the Netherlands and its consequences for exit taxes in the European Union”, 61 (2007) 4 Bulletin for International Taxation 150-158; Bert Zuijdendorp, “The N case: the European Court of Justice sheds further light on the admissibility of exit taxes but still leaves some questions unanswered”, 16 [2007] 1 EC Tax Review 5; J.W.J. De Kort, “The European Court of Justice on the Dutch levy upon emigration of a substantial participation holder in a corporation”, 35 (2007) 12 Intertax 713-718; Hans van den Hurk & Gerben Weening & Jasper Korving, “ECJ rules on Dutch exit tax”, 34 (2006) 11 Intertax 575-576
^27	  As the Court clarified, where a Community national lived in one Member State and had a shareholding in the capital of a company established in another Member State which gave him substantial influence over the company’s decisions and allowed him to determine its activities, as is always the case where he holds 100% of the shares, that would fall within the freedom of establishment. Case C-470/04, paragraph 27.
^28	 Ibid, paragraph 39.
^29	  Ibid, paragraph 35.
^30	  Ibid, paragraph 37.
^31	  Ibid.
^32	  Ibid, paragraph 38. Also see Advocate General’s opinion, paragraph 79.
^33	  Ibid, paragraph 41. The use of this justification on a stand-alone basis was rather novel at the time. In Case C‑446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I‑10837, this justification was to be considered together with two other grounds (preventing double relief of losses and preventing tax avoidance). See paragraph 51. However, in subsequent cases, it was held that this was not a cumulative requirement. The first case was the N case, followed by Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373, paragraphs 51–60 and Case C-379/05 Amurta [2007] ECR I-9569, paragraphs 57–59. See Christiana HJI Panayi, “Reverse Subsidiarity and Cross-border loss relief: Can Member States be left to their own devices?”, 55 [2010] 3 British Tax Review 267-301, 278; Mathieu Isenbaert, EC Law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation, IBFD (Doctoral Series, vol. 19, 2010) 543-544
^34	  Ibid, paragraph 46. 
^35	  Bert Zuijdendorp, “The N case: The European Court of Justice sheds further light on the admissibility of exit taxes but still leaves some questions unanswered”, (2007) 1 EC Tax Review 5, 11. 
^36	  Another argument made by the Advocate General to show the coherence of the Dutch rules was that in addition to the tax liability for emigrating taxpayers with substantial shareholdings, the rules provided a corresponding step-up for immigrating taxpayers at the time of immigration. According to the Advocate General, this method was consistent with the principle of territoriality because it took account only of the profit which had risen during the period of residence within the territory. See paragraph 107. The Court of Justice did not address this point. However, the argument could not succeed and double taxation would not be avoided if the host State did not allow or provide for such a step-up. For example, the UK/Netherlands tax treaty did not impose such a step-up obligation. See Oliver Gutman, “Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt – the ECJ gives its blessimg to corporate exit taxes”, [2009] British Tax Review, 385, 390; Bert Zuijdendorp, “The N case: The European Court of Justice sheds further light on the admissibility of exit taxes but still leaves some questions unanswered”, (2007) 1 EC Tax Review 5, 11.
^37	  Ibid, paragraph 47.
^38	  Ibid, paragraph 49.
^39	  Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on Mutual Assistance for the Recovery of Claims Resulting from Operations Forming Part of the System of Financing the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and of Agricultural Levies and Customs Duties and in Respect of Value Added Tax and Certain Excise Duties. The directive was recently repealed by Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures. This new directive will come into force on 1 January 2011. 
^40	  Council Directive 77/79/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation and taxation of insurance premiums. Following a proposal by the Commission (COM(2009) XXX) on 15 February 2010, ECOFIN adopted a directive aimed at strengthening administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation so as to enable the member states to better combat tax evasion and tax fraud. This directive will come into force on 1 January 2013. See Council of Europe Press Release, 6554/11, PRESSE 27, Brussels, 15 February 2011
^41	  Ibid, paragraph 53-55.
^42	  As regards the costs, the deposit of company shares by way of security may have reduced confidence in the solvency of their owner, to whom less favourable credit conditions might have applied. Ibid, paragraph 57. The decision of the Court of Justice was confirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court when the case went back to it. Mr N was compensated for the cost of providing the guarantee but the preliminary tax assessment stayed intact, with the caveat that future decreases in value of the shares would be taken into account, upon collection. See Hoge Raad, 20 February, 2009, no. 07/12314, V-N 2009/11.9. Also see Charlotte Bornhaupt, “Dutch Supreme Court Upholds Exit Tax on Shareholder”, Tax Analysts, 11/3/2009; Dennis Weber & Alexander Fortuin, “Case Law – The Netherlands, UK”, (2009) 3 EC Tax Review 138.
^43	  See Communication on Exit taxation, fn.6
^44	  Ibid, p.5
^45	  Ibid.
^46	  Ibid, p.7
^47	  Ibid. 
^48	  Communication on Exit taxation, fn.6, pp.5-7
^49	  Council Resolution 16412/08 of Dec. 2, 2008
^50	  This is defined as any operation whereby a taxpayer subject to corporation tax or a natural person engaged in a business ceases to be subject to corporate or personal income tax in a Member State (the exit State) while at the same time becoming subject to corporate or personal income tax in another Member State (the host State); or transfers a combination of assets and liabilities from a head office or a permanent establishment in the exit State to a permanent establishment or a head office in the host State.
^51	  For example, if the home State taxes reserves, the host State could provide for the creation of similar reserves and allow deduction from taxable results for the year in which they were established. See paragraph B.
^52	  Paragraph C.
^53	  Paragraph D
^54	  The provisions of the Mutual Assistance Directive would provide the framework for the host State to assist the exit State, in particular for the purposes of determining the disposal date. See paragraphs E-F.
^55	  Sweden (IP/08/1362, issued on 18 September 2008), Portugal (IP/08/1813, issued on 27 November 2008) and Spain (IP/08/1813, issued on 27 November 2008) were asked to change restrictive exit tax provisions for companies. Spain and Portugal were referred to the Court of Justice (IP/09/1460 of 8 October 2009). Sweden amended its exit tax rules and the case was closed in March 2010. See Mattias Dahlberg, “Sweden Enacts New Exit Tax Rules for Companies”, Tax Analysts (17 November 2009), 2009 WTD 219. The Commission also made formal requests to Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands to change tax rules which impose an immediate exit tax when companies transfer their seat or assets to another Member State (IP/10/299 of 18 March 2010). Denmark and the Netherlands were subsequently referred to the Court of Justice (IP/10/1565 of 24 November 2010). A similar request was made to Ireland to change its exit tax rules which levy a charge on a company on its unrealised capital gains when it transfers its place of central management or control to another Member State. See IP/11/78 of 27 January 2011.
^56	  See analysis in Frederik Zimmer, “Exit Taxes in Norway”, 1 (2009) 1 World Tax Journal 115
^57	  Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV. For commentary, see Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘The Netherlands: Pending Cases Filed by the Netherlands Courts: The National Grid Indus (C-371/10) and Feyenoord (C-498/10)’, in ECJ-Recent Developments in Direct Taxation 2010, edited by Michael Lang et al. (Linde 2011), pp.157-185
^58	  For example, s.185 TCGA 1992 imposes a deemed disposal of assets on company ceasing to be resident in UK. Assets situated in the UK, and which relate to a trade carried on by a continuing UK permanent establishment, are excluded from the charge (s.185(4) TCGA 1992). There are also provisions for deferral of tax where the company transferring its residence is a 75% subsidiary of a UK-resident company (s.187 TCGA 1992). Other legislative provisions have raised concern as well. See s.859 Corporation Taxes Act 2009 which imposes deemed realisation at market value of assets ceasing to be chargeable intangible asset. Within the loan relationships and the derivative contracts regimes, there are also rules for companies ceasing to be UK resident (see s.333 CTA 2009 and s.609 CTA 2009 respectively). For commentary, see David Goldberg, “The ordinary and extra-ordinary Power of the European Court of Justice”, VI (2007) 2 GITC Review 17; Graham J. Airs, “The UK’s Corporate Exit Charge and the EC Treaty”, Tax Journal, Issue 852, p.9 (11 September 2006). 
^59	  This appears to be the approach of the Commission. See, for example, Commission Communication, fn.6, p.5: “The Commission is of the opinion that the interpretation of the freedom of establishment given by the ECJ in de Lasteyrie in respect of exit tax rules on individuals also has direct implications for [Member States’] exit tax rules on companies”. The Commission also refers to the fact that the judgement was written in terms of “taxpayer”, rather than referring merely to taxation on individuals. It also refers to the fact that the Hughes de Lasteyrie case was cited in Case C-411/03 Sevic Systems AG, a case concerning the cross-border merger of companies. See footnote 9 of Commission Communication, p.5. Similar arguments were made by former Commissioner László Kovács in his article, see fn.2.
^60	  This theory is commonly referred to as “siège statuaire” in France or “Gründungstheorie” in Germany. Countries such as the USA, the UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands subscribe to this theory. Furthermore, a number of common law jurisdictions which were formerly British colonies, for example, Cyprus and Malta, adhere to the incorporation theory. See Stephan Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law: A European Perspective, (Oxford University Press, 2001), 10; Robert R. Drury, ‘The regulation and recognition of foreign corporations: The “Delaware syndrome”’, 57(1) [1998] Cambridge Law Journal 165-194; Robert R. Drury, ‘Migrating companies’, 24(4) [1999] European Law Review 354-372; Christiana HJI Panayi, “Corporate Mobility under Private International Law and European Community Law: Debunking Some Myths”, [2009] Yearbook of European Law 123-176, 125-127.
^61	  In this article, administrative seat, centre of administration, actual centre of administration, head office and real seat are used interchangeably. They refer to the place where most, if not all, of the important functions and operations of a company are concentrated.
^62	  Certain reservations may apply for reasons of general interest or on the basis of abuse of law. See Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law’, (March 2003) ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 08/2003, 9.
^63	  The UK and the Netherlands have such ruels. See Dan Prentice, ‘The Incorporation Theory – The United Kingdom’, [2003] 14 European Business Law Review 631; Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law’, 40 [2003] CMLR 661-695, 662 and footnote 4 on Dutch legislation; Elvin R. Latty, ‘Pseudo-foreign corporations’, 65 [1995] Yale Law Journal 137
^64	  The theory is commonly referred to as “Sitztheorie” in Germany, “siège réel” or “siège social” in France. For example, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium subscribe to the real seat theory. See analysis of some ‘real seat’ countries in chapter 4 part III in Stephan Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law: A European Perspective, (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
^65	  The non-recognition of foreign companies which have their centre of administration in another jurisdiction is a very severe sanction of the real seat theory. Non-recognition is sometimes mitigated by international conventions entered into by States, usually on a bilateral basis, which take precedence over their national rules. See, generally, Drury (1998) fn.60, pp.181-182 and Drury (1999) fn.60, p.360; Janeen Carruthers & Charlotte Villiers, ‘Company law in Europe – Condoning the continental drift?’, (2000) 11 European Business Law Review 91, 97; Rammeloo, fn.60, pp.181-183.
^66	  Members of such company may also become personally liable for its debts.  
^67	  See Rammeloo, fn.60, p.15 and chapter 4(III)(i) and HJI Panayi, fn.60, 128-130.
^68	  See, for example, the Convention on Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons [1969] EC Bull Supp 2, negotiated by the then six Member States and drafted on the basis of ex Article 293 EC. This Convention did not show any preference for either the incorporation or the real seat theories and was never ratified. See HJI Panayi, fn.60, p.137 et seq.
^69	  See KPMG’s ‘Study on Transfer of head office of a company from one Member State to another’ (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993). Also see the Commission’s work on a draft Directive which was never officially proposed: Document number XV/D2/6002/97 dated 22 May 1997 and document number XV/D2/6002/97-EN REV.2 dated 11 June 1997. 
^70	  See Motion for a European Parliament Resolution in Report with recommendations to the Commission on the cross-border transfer of the registered office of a company (2008/2196(INI)), dated on 29 January 2009 (A6-0040/2009). The resolution considered the transfer of the registered office only, suggesting that it should not give rise to the winding-up of the company or to any other interruption or loss of legal personality. There were provisions for the protection of the rights of minority shareholders, employees and creditors were protected.
^71	  Case 81/87 Daily Mail [1988] ECR 5483. For commentary, see CM Schmitthoff, ‘Daily Mail Loses in the European Court’ [1988] Journal of Business Law 454; S Frommel, ‘EEC Companies and Migration: A Setback for Europe’ [1988] Intertax 409; Luca Cerioni, ‘The Barriers to the International Mobility of Companies within the European Community: A Re-reading of the Case Law’ [1999] Journal of Business Law 59; Harald Halbhuber, ‘National doctrinal structures and European company law’, 38 [2001] CMLR 1385-1420, 1390
^72	  On company residence under UK tax laws, see, generally, Christiana HJI Panayi, “UK Report”, chapter 22 in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law (EC and International Tax Law Series, volume 5, IBFD, 2009).
^73	  It was common ground, as the Court of Justice noted in paragraph 7, that the proposed transfer of central management and control was tax-driven: it was to enable the emigrating company to avoid capital gains tax in the UK. The aim was, after the company had become non-resident, to sell a significant part of its non-permanent assets and to use the proceeds of that sale to buy its own shares. No UK tax would have been levied on these transactions. The Netherlands could only tax capital gains accruing after the transfer of residence there.
^74	  Ibid, paragraph 8.
^75	  Ibid, paragraph 24.
^76	  Ibid, paragraph 19.
^77	  For the speculation in German scholarship see, Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘No freedom of emigration for companies’, [2005] European Business Law Review 621, 625; Halbhuber, fn.71, pp.1391-1394.
^78	  Ibid, paragraph 21. 
^79	  Ibid, paragraph 24. Emphasis added.
^80	  Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I-09641. 
^81	  Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459. 
^82	  Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919. 
^83	  Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 1-10155. 
^84	  Centros, fn.81. For commentary, see W.F. Ebke, ‘Centros – Some realities and some mysteries’, [2000] American Journal of Comparative Law 623; P.J. Omar, ‘Centros revisited: Assessing the impact on corporate organization in Europe’, [2000] International Company and Commercial Law Review 407; Catherine Holst, ‘European company law after Centros: Is the EU on the road to Delaware?’, [2002] 8 Columbia Journal of European Law 323-341; A Looijestijn-Clearie, ‘Centros Ltd – A Complete U-Turn in the Right of Establishment for Companies?’, (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 622
^85	  Ibid, paragraph 17.
^86	  Ibid, paragraph 18. Emphasis added.
^87	  Ibid, paragraph 24. This was to be assessed by national courts, case by case, taking account of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the basis of objective evidence. Ibid, paragraph 25.
^88	  Ibid, paragraph 26.
^89	  Ibid, paragraphs 27-30. 
^90	  It was argued that the restriction was justified on the basis of protecting public or private creditors by paying a minimum share capital but the argument failed. Ibid, paragraphs 32-35.
^91	  Ibid, paragraph 38.
^92	  Überseering, fn.82. From general commentary see, inter alios, Andrea J. Gildea, ‘Überseering: A European company passport’, [2004] 30(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 257-292; Luca Cerioni, ‘The Überseering ruling: the eve of a revolution for the possibilities of companies’ migration throughout the European Community?’, (2003) 10(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 117-137
^93	  As the Court of Justice pointed out in paragraph 23, Überseering could not be entitled to rights or be subject to obligations. In order to have legal dealings, it had to dissolve itself and reincorporate in a way enabling it to acquire legal capacity under German law.
^94	  Ibid, paragraph 82.
^95	  Ibid, paragraphs 87-90.
^96	  Inspire Art, fn.83. See A Looijestijn-Clearie, ‘Have the dikes collapsed? Inspire Art a further breakthrough in the freedom of establishment of companies,’ (2004) 5 EBOR 389; H-J de Kluiver, ‘Inspiring a new European company law?’, (1/2004) ECFR 121; Werner F. Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’, (2005) 16 (1) European Business Law Review 9.
^97	  Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen (Law on Formally Foreign Companies) of 17 December 1997 (‘WFBV’)
^98	  Art 2 WFBV
^99	  Inter alia, the company had to indicate the status of formally foreign company in all its documents, it had to comply with the minimum share capital rules applicable to Dutch limited companies and it had to produce and publish annual accounts. Arts 3-5 WFBV
^100	  The directors of the company would be jointly and severally liable with the company for all the legal acts carried out in the name of the company during their directorship.
^101	  Ibid, paragraphs 95-98. 
^102	  Ibid, paragraph 103, citing Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919, paragraph 62.
^103	  Ibid, paragraphs 100-101.
^104	  See fn.80. For commentary, see Luca Cerioni, “The Cross-Border Mobility of Companies within the European Community after the Cartesio ruling of the ECJ”, [2010] Journal of Business Law 311; Vittoria Petronella, “The cross-border transfer of the seat after Cartesio and the non-portable nationality of the company”, 21 (2010) 2 E.B.L. Rev. 245-265; Nadja Kubat Erk, “The cross-border transfer of seat in European company law: a deliberation about the status quo and the fate of the real seat doctrine”, 21 (2010) 3 E.B.L. Rev. 413-450; Marek Szydlo, “The right of companies to cross-border conversion under the TFEU rules on freedom of establishment”, 7 (2010) 3 E.C.F.R. 414-443; Justin Borg-Barthet, “European private international law of companies after Cartesio”, 58 (2009) 4 ICLQ 1020-1028; Andrew Johnston & Phil Syrpis, “Regulatory competition in European company law after Cartesio”, 34 (2009) 3 378-404; Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, “The Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment after Cartesio”, 59 (2010) 2 ICLQ 303-323; Hermann Schneeweiss, “Exit Taxation after Cartesio: The European Fundamental Freedom’s Impact on Taxing Migrating Companies”, 37 (2009) 6/7 Intertax 363-374
^105	  Ibid, paragraph 104, citing paragraph 19 of the Daily Mail case.
^106	  Ibid, paragraph 105.
^107	  Ibid, paragraph 110. Emphasis added.
^108	  Ibid, paragraphs 111-112
^109	  Ibid, paragraph 119
^110	  Ibid, paragraph 124. 
^111	  That is of a company that wishes to reincorporate in the host State.
^112	  In fact, the Court has repeatedly avoided making it a disputed issue whether either connecting factor is in breach of EU law by repeatedly asserting that the EU Treaties have not introduced a rule of preference. 
^113	  The cases also refer to situations where exit taxes are applied because a permanent establishment ceases its activities in a Member State or transfers its assets to another Member State. These situations are not discussed in this article.
^114	  It is submitted that this should be checked both as regards the transfer of administrative seat of a company in a real seat State or an incorporation State and the transfer of registered office in a real seat State or an incorporate State. Even though Cartesio applied only to the situation where the administrative seat was to be transferred from a real seat State, it is unlikely that protection would be limited to real seat Member States and not incorporation Member States.
^115	  Also see Alfonso Sanz Clavijo, “The European Commission’s Infringement Cases about Spanish Exit Taxes Provisions for Individuals and Companies”, 38 (2010) 6/7 Intertax 371, 373; Paula Dourado & Pasquale Pistone, “Looking Beyond Cartesio: Reconciliatory Interpretation as a tool to remove tax obstacles on the exercise of the primary right of establishment of companies and other legal entities”,  37 (2009) 6/7 Intertax 342.
^116	  There are different nomenclatures and variations of this connecting factor. Some jurisdictions refer to it as the administrative seat, others as management and control of the company or central management and control, or place of effective management of the company.
^117	  For example, under the OECD Model, if a company is resident in two States because of an overlap of connecting factors, then the tie-breaker clause in the residence article of the Model applies (see Article 4(3) OECD Model). As a result, the company is deemed resident in the State in which its place of effective management is situated and treaty-non-resident in the other State.
^118	  For example, if the home State’s connecting factor for tax residence is based on the place of management of a company, then the transfer of administrative seat (for company law purposes) is also likely to lead to the transfer of tax residence. Vice-versa if the test is based on incorporation of the company and there is a transfer of registered office, again, the transfer of the seat is likely to lead to the transfer of tax residence.
^119	  This was introduced in sections 64 and 66 Finance Act 1988. Under the statutory test, as from 15 March 1988, a UK incorporated company is deemed to be resident in the United Kingdom for tax purposes. See HJI Panayi, fn.72, for a comprehensive review of the UK rules on company residence. 
^120	  It is, of course, always possible for the company to be wound up and to have its assets transferred to a new company incorporated abroad. This, however, would lead to adverse tax consequences, the loss of the identity of the company and the disturbance of its financial arrangements, both internal and external to the company. As a result, some companies opt for a private Act of Parliament in order to achieve immigration without jeopardizing their corporate continuity. This is a much more cumbersome and expensive procedure. For further analysis and examples of companies that proceeded this way, see David Lewis, Corporate Redomicile, 16(10) [1995] Company Lawyer 295-299.
^121	  For the application of the tie-breaker clause, see fn.114.
^122	  A similar argument is made by Kemmeren, in his discussion of the National Grid case. See fn.57, p. 168.
^123	  See question raised by Dourado & Pistone, whether the effectiveness of an EU national’s tax rights should fully depend on the solution of problems involving the harmonization of company law. See Dourado & Pistone, fn.112, 343
^124	  See, for example, the X & Y case discussed in fn.11.
^125	  See, inter alia, Case C-264/96 ICI plc v Colmer [1998] ECR I-4695, Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie, fn.12, Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995, Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation Order [2007] ECR I-2107.
^126	  Case C-9/02, fn.12, paragraph 51
^127	  See, for example, Centros, paragraphs 16-18 and 29-30; Inspire Arte, paragraphs 95-98.
^128	  See Council Directive 76/308/EEC, repealed by Council Directive 2010/24/EU, fn.39
^129	  Under the old version Mutual Assistance Directive, the Directive applied to all claims relating, inter alia, to taxes on income and capital (see Art 2(g) of 76/308/EEC). This would normally include capital gains and corporation tax as well. Request for recovery had to indicate “the name address and any other relevant information relating to the identification of the person concerned [...]” (see Art 7(3(a) of76/308/EEC). Therefore, an emigrating company could be such a person. Under the new version of the Mutual Assistance Directive, in force from 1 January 2012, again the Directive applies to claims relating, inter alia, to all taxes and duties of any kind levied by or on behalf of a Member State (see Art 1(a) of 2010/24/EU. It is evident that companies are included in the concept of a debtor/addressee of instrument. See for example paragraphs 5 and 12 of the Preamble; Article 3(c)(ii) where companies are expressly included in the definition of ‘persons’; Article 6; Article 11(2)(a); Article 20 on costs etc.
^130	  This is another argument why Cartesio ought not apply in the exit tax context. At the very least, the restrictive effects of such exit taxes ought to be considered and not hide behind Cartesio’s pre-emption test.
^131	  See analysis in fn.126.
^132	  See Article 5 of the Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares concerning Companies of Different Member States, amended by Council Directive 2005/19/EC.
^133	  There is currently a preliminary reference from the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court concerning the treatment of tax losses in a cross-border merger between a Swedish limited company and a Finnish LLC, when there is no remaining permanent establishment. The referring court is asking whether under freedom of establishment such transfer losses should be permitted when it is allowed in mergers between these companies resident companies. See Seppo Penttila and Martti Nieminen, “Finland requests ECJ ruling on transfer of cross-border merger”, 2011 WTD 49-2. 
^134	  See Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I‑2493, paragraphs 25-26
^135	  See also De Broe, fn.5, p.75, Malmer, fn.6, pp.87-89.
^136	  See, for example, Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793; Case C-376/03 D [2005] ECR I-5821; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I -10837; Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373; Case C-265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I-923; ACT Group Litigation case; Case C-170/05 Denkavit; Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium; Case C-157/07 Krankenheim.
^137	  See analysis in Part II above.
